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INTERLIB

Journal of the Liberal International British Group



**IRAN-CHINA: KASHMIR: BUILD BACK BETTER
CHINA FORUM: LIB DEM CONFERENCE.**

EVENTS

19th September International Talk Like A Pirate Day

26th-29th September Liberal Democrats' Autumn Conference. **Will be an Online event.**

23rd October Second reading of Alistair Carmichael's Hong Kong Bill, House of Commons.

For bookings & other information please contact the Treasurer below.

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London SW1A 2HE
Underground: Embankment

Liberal International (British Group)
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relating to various authors



Chinese Liberal Democrats have an online survey on the situation in Hong Kong. To participate please go to <https://chineselibdems.org.uk/en/survey/survey-on-the-situation-in-hong-kong>



LIBG 2020 PROGRAMME



A programme of events for LIBG has been organised by the executive for the rest of the year. It is intended that these will be held physically at the National Liberal Club starting at 6.30pm in each case, but also broadcast online. These arrangements will obviously depend on both corona virus restrictions and technology.

Details of online access, speakers and exact subjects will be announced nearer the time for each. Please check the forthcoming events link on the LIBG website, www.libg.co.uk

China: killing the goose that laid the golden egg?

**September 14th 7:00pm - 8:30pm
(not 6.30pm as previously advertised)**

Please note this meeting will be held virtually, login details to follow.

Those interested should notify: adrian.trett@gmail.com

SPEAKER-PANELLIST BRIEFING

Does an emerging new military-economic model in China, mark the final demise of its 'Peaceful Rise' doctrine, under President Xi Jinping? Is the driver of the new approach still ultimately, economic growth, or are we witnessing the separate pursuit of Chinese defence aims in relation to the US and perhaps India, or even broader hegemonic ambitions? This webinar explores these questions from differing perspectives, and attempts to look past the mainstream narratives from all sides, in pursuit of an independent assessment.

A more assertive China in international trade, the acquisition of more secure energy and other resources, and expanding Chinese-controlled global infrastructure to support it (such as 'Belt & Road' and 'String of Pearls'), all appear potentially to be features of a new 'China model'. Assessing China's long-term aims is important for Western economic policy as much as it is for security policy. It affects the Western approach to the slow build-up of military capacity around Chinese 'String of Pearls' ports and terminals, for example. What's more, to what extent is any 'new model' focused only on international policy, or are there parallel changes to the economic system domestically?

These are questions of longer-term global impact, which go beyond the excitements of 2020. Whilst in part the rise in Western 'demonisation' of China in mid-2020 is undoubtedly linked to the US presidential elections, longer term Western policy must be based on a realistic understanding of changes in Chinese political-economy and security doctrine, and also of the capacity of China in reality to pursue aims globally.

Exploring these difficult underlying issues, and taking questions, will be an expert panel, including:

Dr Kerry Brown, who is Director of the Lau China Institute and Professor of Chinese Studies at King's College, London. Previously he was Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney. He is an Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London. He was previously Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, London and a member of the British Diplomatic Service from 1998 to 2005, serving as First Secretary, British Embassy, Beijing 2000-2003.

Dr Yeow Poon has 25 years' experience of providing capacity building and counsel on public administration, community participation and governance reform in China, Vietnam, Lao PDR and more recently in Myanmar. Dr Poon has observed the way these countries have grappled with balancing the rapid changes that have taken place in these countries as a result of economic reforms and the adoption of 'grassroots democracy', 'internal democratic systems' and modern management whilst maintaining the one-party state apparatus and national security.

Rebecca Tinsley, who is a journalist and human rights activist who has grappled with Chinese foreign policy and global power projection at the 'sharp end', especially countries in conflict where China plays an increasingly less subtle role. Rebecca founded 'Waging Peace', Network for Africa, a charity working with survivors of genocide. Rebecca was asked by President and Mrs Carter to start the Carter Centre UK. She was on the London Committee of HRW for seven years, and has attended human rights trials on their behalf. Her books include the acclaimed 'When The Stars Fall To Earth' about the genocide in Darfur.

The webinar will be chaired by **Paul E M Reynolds**. Paul has wide experience in economic and political reforms in 70 countries worldwide, especially countries in conflict. In China Paul has worked with the Ministry of Finance, State Council, Central Party School, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority; and with governments in 7 countries contiguous to China.

Later this year...

2 October - 6.30 pm by Zoom

Poland & Hungary LGBT+ Rights - joint hosting from LIBG, LGBT+ Lib Dems and LDEG

12 October

75 years of peace with the UN - is it still upholding the spirit of supporting human rights or does its form need to change?

9 November

Annual General Meeting (postponed from July due to pandemic restrictions) followed at 7.00pm by speaker meeting

7 December

What's happening to the USA's Global position, and what are the threats?

LIBERAL DEMOCRAT AUTUMN CONFERENCE THE INTERNATIONAL BITS

The Liberal Democrats' Autumn Conference will be held online this year, from Friday 25th to Monday 28th September. The International Agenda is thin, but this is an experiment. LIBG for example, chose to run a Forum just ahead of the conference, and this is stage, the usual suspects of the Fringe are missing; we hope there may be some updates.

Saturday 26th

- 10.00am Question & Answer session on Foreign Affairs and looking beyond the end of the Brexit transition period. With Baroness Lindsay Northover (Foreign Affairs spokesperson in the House of Lords) and Baroness Sarah Ludford (Euope spokesperson in the House of Lords).
- 18.45-19.35 Fringe: Liberal Democrats for Seekers of Sanctuary

Sunday 27th

- 10.00 Topical motion
10.50 Policy motion: Racial Justice Cannot Wait
16.00-16.50 Fringe: Liberal Democrats Overseas – Frozen Pensions to Lost Pensions, dealing with Britain's pension mis-steps
16.00-16.50 Fringe: Liberal Democrats for Seekers of Sanctuary AGM
16.00-16.50 Fringe: Her Majesty's Government of Gibraltar – Brexit in times of Covid-19
17.25 Policy motion: Europe

Monday 28th

- 17.00 Consultative session: The World after Covid-19
18.05 Topical motion
18.50 Policy motion: Hong Kong's Future

https://www.libdems.org.uk/a20-agenda?utm_campaign=a20%20members&utm_campaign=a20_agenda_members&utm_medium=email&utm_medium=email&utm_source=nationbuilder&utm_source=libdems

Lib Dems Overseas Conference Fringe Meeting Sunday 27th 13:00-13:50

Frozen Pensions to Lost Pensions - dealing with Britain's pension mis-steps

No one's getting younger. This concerns everyone. The Triple lock threatened. Half million pensions frozen abroad. Our pensions under attack. What's to be done?

Join:

Baroness Sal Brinton

John Duffy, International British Pensions

Pensioner Testimonials

Moderator: George Cunningham, Chair Lib Dems Overseas

The Iran-China Love-In

Jonathan Fryer

Winston Churchill once famously said that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Actually, this was a riff on an ancient Arab proverb and it has rung true throughout the ages. The latest example is the way that Iran has turned to China as a key ally in its stand-off with the United States. Given that a sort of Cold War Mark II is developing between Washington and Beijing, the new Beijing-Tehran axis will have growing global as well as regional consequences.

From China’s point of view, Iran is strategically important as a major piece in the jigsaw that is the Belt and Road Initiative – China’s global infrastructure development strategy embracing 70 countries and international organisations. This involves massive Chinese investment in return for greater connectivity, expanding the market for Chinese goods and gaining access to resources.

Iran’s principal resource is its oil, for which China has an insatiable appetite, being heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports. Under a planned 25-year Strategic Partnership agreement that is due to be ratified by Iran’s parliament later this year, Iran will guarantee a steady supply of oil at an advantageous price. In return, China will invest heavily in modernising Iran’s creaking oil industry infrastructure and associated industrial zones. This flies in the face of the Trump administration’s attempts to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran through sanctions, especially in the energy sector. But Beijing could not care less.

Moreover, China has said it will help Iran develop its nuclear energy capacity, too. And that is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The total value of the 25-year deal is estimated at \$400 billion and will include making Iran’s railway network, roads and ports fit for the 21st Century. Three free trade zones are planned and the Makran coast of Iranian Baluchistan is going to have a complete makeover, including the creation of new tourist resorts. Outside of periods with COVID19 restrictions, the Chinese are now the world’s most enthusiastic tourists, and Iran is an attractive *terra incognita* for them.

What will really concern Washington and some of its European allies, however, is that China will now become a major military partner of Iran as well. Tehran already has close military ties with Russia, especially because of their joint involvement in propping up Bashar al-Assad in Syria. But the military link with China is likely to become far more significant and will be largely based at sea. China already has the world’s largest navy, is flexing its nautical muscles not just in the South China Sea but in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The Indian Ocean could become its new frontier.



This may all seem strange given that China and Iran have ideologically opposed political systems, despite both being authoritarian: communism on the one hand, theocracy on the other. But both governments seem willing to put that unfortunate fact to one side. This even extends to the way that the Iranian authorities has refused to condemn China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Indeed, some Iranian commentators have even praised the Chinese for stamping on what they describe as the

Saudi Wahhabi Sunni *takfiri* brand of Islamic fundamentalism that has been spreading in central Asia. Most Iranians, of course, are Shia.

Another motive for the Iranians cuddling up to the Chinese is that they feel bitterly let down by Europe. The Permanent 5 of the UN Security Council – the US, Russia, China, Britain and France – plus Germany were the guarantors of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal or JCPOA*, and after President Trump withdrew in 2018 Iran looked to the EU to do more, in terms of investment and trade, as well as political support, to lessen the impact of US sanctions. Though the EU and Britain have remained steadfast in their determination to try to keep the JCPOA alive nonetheless many European companies and financial institutions have been wary of provoking American retaliation by dealing with Iran. In contrast, China apparently has no qualms. Moreover, when the Trump administration tried to invoke the JCPOA “snapback” mechanism on sanctions – despite having withdrawn from the agreement – China voted against at the UN Security Council whereas the Europeans, including Belgium and Estonia, just sat on their hands.

This does not mean that all Iranians are thrilled at the prospect of the new strategic alliance with China. The Tehran Bazaar – historically a politically important player in the country’s fortunes – is worried about the arrival of yet more Chinese goods flooding the market and undercutting local produce. Economically, Iran is in poor shape, not just because of US pressure but also because of government mismanagement. The population is overwhelmingly young, grew up after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and is worried by a lack of sufficient jobs and low wages.

Then there is the issue of the coronavirus. Though Iran has not followed Donald Trump’s practice of referring to it as the “Chinese virus”, many Iranians do blame close links with China for the spread of the pandemic. Officially, there have been about 380,000 infections in Iran and approximately 22,000 deaths, though some opposition sources suggest the figure may be significantly higher. This has certainly had a significant impact on national morale and the prospect of new golden dawn in partnership with China may not easily dispel that.

Jonathan Fryer

Jonathan Fryer is a writer and broadcaster on the Middle East and North Africa and is Chair of the Liberal Democrats’ Federal International Relations Committee.

*JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Why Britain should worry about Kashmir

Paul Reynolds

Kashmir is one of those decades-long conflicts which rarely makes it into the mainstream UK media; until recently. In June this year 20 Indian soldiers died in fighting with Chinese soldiers, on the border between Indian-administered and Chinese-administered Kashmir.

So what is the nature of the conflict and why has it become much more dangerous this year ?

Central to the recent upsurge in violence, lies China-India relations. To understand, we must start with 'British India'. After Indian independence following WW2, Kashmir was divided into Pakistan administered and Indian administered territory, with two smaller areas controlled by China. Both the Pakistani and Indian administered sides are majority Muslim, except (Buddhist) Ladakh, on the Chinese border.

India and Pakistan have more than once gone to war over territory, and so have India and China.

When Indian administered Kashmir was established, the spectre of future Kashmiri independence was raised, and significant autonomy provided for in Article 370 of the Indian Constitutions, later also by Article 35A.

Among these provisions were restricted involvement of the Indian state (foreign policy, defence etc). Land ownership and receipt of public services like education and health were restricted to Kashmiris. Article 370,

leading potentially to independence, was a factor in the measure of acceptance by Kashmiris of Indian administration early on.

However, in the late 1980s an insurgency by Muslim Kashmiris against Indian administration started, with various forms of support, overt and covert, from Pakistan. This rise in violence against Indian rule was largely a result of gradual erosion of autonomy and democracy; and fading prospects of independence.

Over the decades Kashmir became a nationalist issue in Pakistan, but even more so in India, where political declarations that 'all of Kashmir was India' were prompted by the Hindu nationalist RSS (Rāṣṭrīya Svayamsevaka Saṅgha) party.



However, a ceasefire in 2003 brought new optimism, and the Indian government set up a series of Working Groups to examine steps to resolve the Kashmir conflict. The 2008 Mumbai attacks ended peace efforts, and further fuelled Indian nationalism.

In the 2014 election BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) leaders declared their intent to revoke Articles 370 and 35A, and bring Kashmir under central control from Delhi. After the Indian elections in April 2019, the BJP were in a stronger position. Thus, in the Summer of 2019 India revoked Articles 370 and 35A, downgraded Kashmir to a union territory, split off Ladakh, and bypassed the local Kashmiri

politicians. This led to an increase in insurgency activity and a spiral of reduced human rights and conflict.

This has worried China for one key reason; the 'Belt and Road Initiative'. This is the Chinese economy looking overland towards Europe, Middle East and South Asia, together with massive infrastructure investment. This is leader Xi Jinping's megaproject; to keep growth going, to access oil in Western China, and as insurance against a maritime blockade.

Key parts of Belt and Road Initiative run through Pakistani Kashmir down to the Chinese-run Gwadar port and military installation, in Pakistan. A major conflict in Kashmir would involve China and scupper much of BRI; and likely end the political career of Xi Jinping. The 'China-Pakistan Corridor', as known, is already fragile due to poor Pakistani governance. China-Pakistan relations could fracture, too.

China and India have become rivals. Trade between them is surprisingly small. China protested at the revocation of Article 370, and border fighting has tested Indian defences.

The US (and now UK) have demonised China this year, in part due to US elections, and sided with nationalist-run India over Kashmir. The scene is set for a major conflict where mistakes could lead to a devastating war. The UK will be blamed, at least in part.

Instead the UK should accept its responsibilities and promote a return to a 3-way ceasefire and peace-building measures, rather than taking sides in pursuit of trade deals, whilst giving up on China to please the US.

Paul Reynolds.

Paul Reynolds is an executive member of LIBG,

This article first appeared in Lib Dem Voice 27th August, 2020

One cannot fault Alistair Carmichael's handling of the Foreign Affairs profile, particularly in respect of China's handling of Hong Kong and its Uyghur minority, where the worst elements of Communism and Imperialism still run rife. Alistair hands the post over to Layla Moran, whose manifesto for the Liberal Democrat leadership, Build Back Better, showed a deep commitment to Internationalism, which as we've said before, is an arena where Liberal voices can be heard. It would have been inappropriate for LIBG to promote a particular candidate in another LI party's internal elections, and Liberal Democrat members of LIBG would have or form their own views. In the inundation of the leadership contest, you may have taken less note of that commitment, so we republish the papers that the Moran team provided, and hope that will stay with Layla under her new portfolio.

A liberal voice in a changed world

Martin Horwood

You might imagine that a common enemy in the form of the coronavirus would bring the world together as never before. Instead, the pandemic has sharpened and accelerated trends that were already alarming liberals and progressives the world over.

The crisis has triggered the sudden closing of borders, even within the EU's treasured free movement area, which was already under pressure from migration crises and the domestic politics of immigration. Hasty export controls on food and medical equipment have raised more barriers between nations.

State bailouts and stimulus, life-saving both economically and literally, are storing up debt crises and causing fights over burden-sharing. Nerves are fraying, from the IMF to the European Central Bank. Relations between Washington and Beijing—already sour from trade wars and growing geopolitical rivalry—have descended into a coronavirus blame game full of nationalist rhetoric and misinformation on both sides. And both powers chose this moment to escalate rather than reduce tensions around the world. The US increased Iran's coronavirus agony and invoked the Defense Protection Act against its Canadian and European allies, while China sent troops over India's Himalayan border and ramped up its belligerent rhetoric on Taiwan as the world worried about face masks and PPE.

Populist hardliners worldwide have wrought varying degrees of havoc by denying the severity of the crisis— as Putin and Bolsonaro have done— or by seizing the moment for authoritarian power grabs, like Orbán and Duterte. At the moment where a coordinated, multilateral response was most needed, Trump pulled the US out of the World Health Organisation.

But it is not in the nature of Liberals to hunker down and wait for global economic collapse or escalating conflict.

As the contributors to this chapter spell out, the pandemic may yet give us the opportunity to fight back and use this crisis to make the case for new forms of global co-operation and long-overdue International relations reforms. Brexit threatens to leave the UK retreating into its shell. But there is also a moment here to champion global co-operation, defuse confrontations, and to learn from others.

Peter Frankopan underlines the need for Britain to abandon its outdated exceptionalism and construct new global alliances. Whit Mason wants us to realise that potential but spells out the need within British government for culture change and more strategic focus – and for a realistic understanding of our new place in the world.

Irina von Wiese rings the alarm bells for human rights and democracy during the crisis, even in the heart of Europe, but argues for a fightback based on international collaboration. My own contribution accepts that the challenges for sustainable development have only been increased by coronavirus, and makes the case for more investment but also for shaking up the way we do development.

Fionna Tod exposes the systemic weaknesses that have characterised health policy worldwide, laid bare by the coronavirus. She warns that future global health challenges could be even deadlier so the need to invest in more resilient and equitable global health systems is more critical than ever. And Christine Cheng offers us a pathway to resisting Trumpian cold war rhetoric but answering the genuine need for a co-ordinated and strategic response to China's determination to fill the global power vacuum.

Coronavirus may have made the world an even more dangerous and daunting place than it was a year ago, but that world needs Britain to turn outwards, not inwards, and to actively seek allies to meet that challenge.

Martin Horwood

The new order

Peter Frankopan

The UK 'has always taken a leading role in responding to global challenges' according to the government. This is not so much a debateable statement as a palpably false one, given that the United Kingdom did not



come into being until the Act of Union of 1707. Taken over the long term, the UK's 'golden age' was both recent and highly unusual, the result of a particular set of circumstances and contexts that are often poorly understood or simply overlooked.

Amongst the many challenges facing the UK today is finding a place in the world of the twenty-first century. Framing the country's role in the context of the past is unhelpful, if not a case of wishful thinking. Statements that celebrate the centrality of the UK to global affairs perfectly encapsulate the dangers of over-simplification and, more importantly, underline a strong sense of entitlement that comes with embedded assumptions that the UK has earned the right to play a leading role.

Having a rich historical legacy is more complex and contentious than it might seem, as recent debates around race, slavery, inequality and imperialism make clear. The government's claim that the UK has always been outstanding at 'making the most of opportunities for our country' obscures the reality that wealth, influence and power were framed by the exploitation of peoples and materials all round the world. Empires function by resources being brought from the peripheries to the centre. They result in embedded elites, dramatic inequalities and uneven distribution of opportunities. The British Empire was no different. The slogan of 'Global Britain' may therefore sound promising to those who take solace from the belief that Britannia once ruled the waves. The cold reality, however, is that the world today is not just very different for the UK, but for countries all round the world. It is a world that is changing fast, fuelled in part by new technologies whose powers, risks and fragilities are poorly understood, and partly by the rise of successful, resilient authoritarianism that is forcing naïve assumptions about the triumph of liberal democracy finally to be challenged. Then there are outlier events, such as the coronavirus pandemic that can, and will, have dramatic consequences not only for how we live and work, but also for the wider geopolitical picture because it has become part of a proxy war between the US and China.

In this context, the UK risks being squeezed out not only by the US and by China, but between the two. Brexit also means that however imperfect the EU was and is, the solace and protection of safety in numbers has been removed. Ironically, one area of real British expertise over the last century, as the age of empire finally passed, has been in navigating a way through building new alliances and partnerships. Some would call this the art of diplomacy. Others might even say that this is what practical liberalism is all about: finding areas of common interest where states can work together productively and proactively and building mutual trust to be able to listen and learn about points of view that do not converge.

It might seem nonsensical to withdraw from one political and economic grouping, like the EU, only to propose another. But one key area will be for the UK to develop more meaningful, more intensive and more practical relationships with other states where overlapping interests can result in common positions regarding geopolitical threats, future pandemics, adoptions of new technologies, responses to climate change and more besides.

Membership of the G7, a permanent seat at the United Nations and long-standing expertise provide a platform to look beyond the grouping of rich, Western states that the UK usually looks to for support and collaboration. The UK should therefore be looking to establish a new network of states: the ‘Development 20’, or D20. This should include countries in North and sub-Saharan Africa, in Asia and in the Americas to provide a practical forum for agreeing common standpoints and counter increasingly well-coordinated and effective positions between systemic rivals, to spend time, energy and resources on developing long-term visions for the future and on shaping working, practical relationships that are able to bear fruit.

The UK should therefore be looking to establish a new network of states: the ‘Development 20’, or D20. Global Britain requires a wider perspective on the UK’s direction of travel, its place in the wider world and the opportunities and risks that lie in the future.

Global Britain requires a wider perspective on the UK’s direction of travel, its place in the wider world and the opportunities and risks that lie in the future. There is also the potential to recognise that we are not unique in facing these questions and that other states, including those that are emerging and will play bigger and more important roles in the future, are worth bringing to the table in a formal capacity to find ways to work together. This new D20 group cannot be based on the crude exclusivity of wealth and GDP, like the G20. Rather it should be centred on nations that are strategically important, developing countries that offer long-term potential and on partners that can in some instances provide much-needed expertise and leverage. This would include, for example, Nigeria, Jordan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina and others – The UK should therefore be looking to establish a new network of states: the ‘Development 20’, or D20. Global Britain requires a wider perspective on the UK’s direction of travel, its place in the wider world and the opportunities and risks that lie in the future. International relations 97 including those whose political leaderships do not resemble our own, such as Thailand, Vietnam and several central Asian states.

The ‘international rules-based order’ is a wonderful thing if you set the rules, if you think you’ve always taken ‘a leading role in responding to global challenges’ and, above all, if you are convinced that the outcomes of that leading role have always been optimal. It might just be that with Brexit, a global depression, continued uncertainties around the pandemic, concerns about China, Russia, Iran and beyond that this could be a moment to be thinking hard about how to work with others, rather than on our own.

Peter Frankopan

Peter Frankopan is Professor of Global History at Oxford University, where he is also Senior Research Fellow at Worcester College, Oxford and Stavros Niarchos Foundation Director of the Oxford Centre for Byzantine Research. Peter is author of *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World* and *The New Silk Roads: The Future and Present of the World*, both, major international bestsellers.

Breaking the cycle of neglect in global health

Fionna Tod

For too long, world leaders have accepted a cycle of panic and neglect in response to major disease outbreaks, failing to invest in long-term pandemic preparedness and hoping to avoid the worst when disaster hits. Despite ever-more complex international supply chains and an extraordinary rise in international travel making the spread of infectious diseases like SARS-CoV-2 inevitable, most countries ignored repeated warnings from global health experts on the looming security threat of a pandemic.

At the same time, this global health crisis has tested our twentieth-century rules-based international system and, in the face of the nationalist populism so rampant across the world, it has been found wanting. Diplomacy is by its nature an act of compromise, yet many world leaders dismiss compromise as a weakness, undermining the diplomatic principles on which the United Nations is built. The World Health Organisation has become the battleground for a political tussle between superpowers, with only a superficial connection to global health.

The WHO faces an impossible task – it has no authority to compel nation states to act in a certain way – but it has shown solid leadership since the outbreak began, especially in low and middle-income countries, where its normative role remains essential. Calls to scrap it and other UN institutions and start again should be rejected. The UK must continue to lend its expertise to reinforce these organisations, with a renewed



focus on strengthening their core capabilities and making them less encumbered by bureaucracy. US funding of WHO and other UN organisations has been disproportionately high from the outset, giving the country uneven sway over their policies. The pandemic has revealed an urgent need to recalculate countries' assessed contributions to the UN system. The global system can no longer afford to rely on unstable US backing, and the UK should lead the campaign for a more equitable funding system.

The pattern of tying WHO funding to specific diseases and projects is mirrored in the wider global health community. This siloing of funds means that activists advocate for resources on their single issue, which often results in vertical programming that fails to improve overall health systems. This funding pattern makes progress fragile and easily overturned by an epidemic or pandemic outbreak. A new approach is needed: the UK should invest its overseas development aid in programmes that yield measurable horizontal benefits, underpinned by a commitment to universal health coverage. There is also an urgent need for the interface between animal and human health to be better aligned, given that almost all of the last century's pandemic pathogens originated in animals (see also Chapter 5, Environment).

Data is a critical element of global health that is notoriously weak. The UK should use its leadership position within organisations like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, to strive for better health data. Advances in technology such as GPS, cheap sensors and networked diagnostics, raise the prospect of truly verifying the impact of programmes. Governments and organisations that provide robust, verifiable data should be rewarded and encouraged, even if that means revealing that coverage of key services, like vaccinations, is lower than the current official data.

The next pandemic is likely to be bigger and deadlier than the coronavirus, and that is not the only looming health threat for which we need to prepare. Antimicrobial resistance is a creeping enemy with the potential to wreak as much, if not more, havoc than an airborne pathogen. One clear way of encouraging states to prioritise preparedness is to follow a call made back in 2016 by a group of global health experts to incorporate global health risk into macroeconomic analyses such as the International Monetary Fund's Article IV consultations, and ratings agencies' and risk consultancies' models. The coronavirus has demonstrated that pandemics can decimate economies around the world and we should not be afraid to use innovative financial levers to incentivise countries to prepare properly.

Yet again, we find our governments panicking in the face of a new disease threat. The urge to return to 'life as normal' will be strong, but life as normal created the conditions for this pandemic in the first place. We have an opportunity, and a responsibility, to invest heavily in building more resilient, equitable, and robust health systems and to ensure that the cycle of panic and neglect in global health is broken forever.

Fionna Tod

Fionna Tod was a Liberal Democrat parliamentary adviser on Brexit and Foreign Affairs. She contested Eastern England in the 2019 Euro Elections and Mid Norfolk in the 2017 General Election. Fionna is a Manager in Global Health Strategies' Europe Office. 'GHS uses advocacy, communications and policy analysis to advance issues and power campaigns that improve health and well being around the world.'

Embracing and confronting China

Dr Christine Cheng

In 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organisation, no one imagined that in less than twenty years it would grow into the world's second largest economy and emerge as a global rival to America. Between 2001 and 2018, China's GDP per capita went from \$1,000 to \$9,800, pulling hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and disease and transforming the global economy. As Liberal Democrats, we should celebrate China's success as one of the greatest development stories in the history of the world.

Yet China's modernisation didn't lead to the political change that the West had envisioned. Instead of submitting to democratic reforms and allowing itself to be liberalised in a Western-friendly way, China created its own version of authoritarian capitalism and set up its own rivals to the big multinationals of the West. As China grew economically and politically more powerful, bringing African and nearby Asian states into its orbit of influence, Britain's relationship with it also changed. Whereas a succession of British foreign ministers used to routinely rebuke China for its human rights abuses, our willingness— as a country and as a party— to upset Beijing has declined significantly as China has become richer and more influential.



Under the coalition government, Britain was especially keen to deepen its trade and investment relationships with China— even at the expense of calling out the country's human rights abuses. As George Osborne remarked in 2015, 'Britain can't run away from China. Quite the opposite. Britain should run towards China.' Liberal Democrats too, have had an ambivalent relation with China— on the one hand loudly denouncing how Beijing managed the Hong Kong protests throughout 2019 and 2020, but on the other, arguing for Britain to join the Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank. This is the pre-coronavirus landscape that structured the UK–China relationship.

As the coronavirus pandemic struck Britain in March 2020, the tensions that lurked beneath the surface of the relationship were forced out into the open: Hong Kong, Huawei's 5G contract, Britain's need for post-Brexit trade deals with both the US and China. Even today, with British lives hanging in the balance, the Prime Minister has yet to decide what kind of relationship he wants Britain to have with the world's largest supplier of personal protective equipment.

If there's one thing that the virus has revealed, it is that China can only be confronted when other democracies are willing to band together. Caught between the US and China, smaller countries like Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea already know to be wary. Over the past 18 months, two Canadians have been held as hostages in the 5G wars between China and the US. More recently, when Australia asked for a WHO public inquiry into the origins of coronavirus, China retaliated by restricting some meat exports and slapping an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley. In our case, China has already threatened 'countermeasures' after the British government offered Hong Kong citizens a path to British citizenship after China violated the 'one country, two systems' principle.

Unfortunately, this fine line between friend and foe will become more and more difficult to maintain as China becomes simultaneously richer, more militarily aggressive and more globally influential. Britain, and by extension the Liberal Democrats, will be forced to choose between America and China. America's China hawks will undoubtedly push Britain to make that choice sooner rather than later.

There is a third way to deal with China: through Europe. Whether we are inside or outside the European Union, only Europe is too big to be politically bullied into submission.

Yet there is a third way to deal with China: through Europe. Any world map makes this obvious. Whether we are inside or outside the European Union, only Europe is too big to be politically bullied into

submission. Only Europe has the global economic leverage to challenge China as the world's second biggest trading bloc. Only Europe has the moral authority to speak out and convince the Chinese to listen. Without the weight of Europe behind us, we are simply not powerful enough to challenge China by ourselves. The pandemic has made this abundantly clear. With the US distracted by its own internal problems, only Europe has the political heft needed to lead.

Liberal Democrats can continue to hope that China's rise will be that of a friendly competitor, but right now, the British government needs to plan strategically for an increasingly powerful 'frenemy'. In practice, frenemy politics translates into three policy principles: sincere engagement on common causes; continuing to stand up for our liberal values; and building redundancies and national resilience into mission-critical supply chains.

First, we must keep engaging China on all issues where we find agreement. Even as tensions increase, there is nothing that precludes enthusiastic British cooperation with China on common concerns. There is a third way to deal with China: through Europe. Whether we are inside or outside the European Union, only Europe is too big to be politically bullied into submission.

such as the climate and debt crises. China is the world's biggest investor in renewables, as well as leading the world in producing, exporting and installing wind turbines, solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles. With its citizens clamouring for clean air, China is domestically motivated to reduce vehicle emissions. The Liberal Democrats can and should look for opportunities to deepen scientific and private sector engagement with China on green issues— while recognising that renewable technology will take on increasing strategic importance.

Second, we must continue to stand up for our liberal values. In the coming years, Britain and its allies will find it difficult to speak out against President Xi and the Chinese Communist Party. China's four 'internal' zones of unrest (Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan) will remain taboo subjects and the people of Tibet and Xinjiang in particular will continue to suffer the horrific consequences of internment and forced assimilation. Within this space, we are uniquely positioned to call out China in large part because we are unlikely to take power any time soon. We can afford to be honest and blunt in a way that other parties cannot.

Our liberal values are what distinguishes us, not just as a party, but also as a country. We must lean into these values and invest political capital in defending them. The most effective way to do this is to ally ourselves even more closely with our European friends in the first instance, and then to develop deeper ties with a new 'coalition of democracies'.

Finally, Liberal Democrats should support the re-routing of global supply chains where China is the choke point for components that are critical to national security. In this instance, coronavirus has revealed the world's reliance on China's PPE production capacity. It has also revealed that China is using its control of PPE supplies to curry favour for 5G contracts. Shutting China completely out of global supply chains is impossible and counterproductive. Instead, what the pandemic has taught us is that some supply chains are more critical than others and that we need to adjust our regulatory frameworks to deal with national security situations. Determining the specific adjustments that are needed will be a complex years-long national security and supply chains process that we should begin now, alongside the Brexit negotiations.

Along the way, we must not forget that the Chinese government and the Chinese people are not one and the same. Just as Liberal Democrats vehemently disagree with the Conservative government on many important issues, there are many Chinese citizens who want to nudge China towards greater internal transparency and accountability. After all, it was the Chinese people who exploded in anger when a Wuhan doctor, Li Wenliang, accused the government of covering up what was happening in the early days of the virus's spread. He contracted coronavirus from one of his patients and died on 7 February 2020.

After the battering effects of Brexit and coronavirus, Britain's influence in the world will continue to decline. We will need to simultaneously embrace and confront China. And we will need to do so with friends by our side. For Britain and for the Liberal Democrats, it is the only way forward.

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Development will be tougher than ever, but change is possible

Martin Horwood

When the world gathered in 2015 to adopt the UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals – a 'bold new global agenda to end poverty by 2030 and pursue a sustainable future' – Obama, Cameron, Gates and Bloomberg all spoke of global co-operation and the billions that would be mobilised from public and private wealth. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, a Korean, joked with World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, a Korean-American, that Koreans were taking over the world. The leading role of such global institutions



seemed unassailable and Korea – open, internationalist and democratic – really was the model development story.

While the world still faced monumental challenges, this optimism wasn't entirely misplaced: extreme poverty had declined significantly and so had debilitating debt crises. Latin America, Africa and Asia all had their success stories. Hunger, child mortality and maternal mortality had fallen. Access to clean drinking water and to primary education— especially for girls— had improved. Even deadly epidemics like HIV finally seemed to be in retreat, as millions gained access to anti-retroviral therapies.

In the UK, the coalition had enshrined the UN's 0.7 per cent of GNP aid target in law, thanks to the Lib Dems, focused international development policy on the poorest people and most fragile countries, emphasised conflict reduction, gender equality and the environment. We took on female genital mutilation at community level, and pulled the UK's pioneering development investment company CDC back to its development roots. We increased accountability and transparency

by establishing the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, and quickly adopting the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which tracks aid flows from donor to project, reducing waste and corruption. Data showed well-targeted UK aid reaching the parts private investment rarely did.

It was a world in which liberals felt at home, but it now feels like a lifetime ago – before Trump, Brexit, Johnson and now the coronavirus.

A pandemic-induced global recession will cast millions back into extreme poverty and undo those hard-won gains. The UN expects the pandemic to shrink global trade by up to 32 per cent, remittances to low and middle-income countries by around 20 per cent and foreign direct investment by 35 per cent. Nigeria's staple oil revenues have already plummeted and other nations face similar shocks with all the attendant risks of instability and conflict. One estimate puts the cost of the crisis to Africa at \$100 billion. Barriers have been thrown up around the world. The WTO reports 80 countries restricting exports, including food and medical supplies.

Far from 'leaving no one behind' – the SDG mantra – we have allowed minorities and migrants to suffer disproportionately, either from the virus itself or from clumsy government responses. In the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, more people died from the interruption of services and economic breakdown than

from the virus itself. China's development offer— unequal but generous, and conveniently careless about transparency, human rights or the environment— was gaining ground before the coronavirus and may now look even more tempting to governments gazing into an economic abyss.

But amidst all this there is an opportunity for Liberal Democrats to push the positive reshaping of development cooperation. We should invest much more in and through CDC, and champion 'blended finance' that takes commercially sound investment (as well as aid) to communities that would not achieve that investment from the private sector alone. We should prioritise locally-driven, environmentally-friendly infrastructure and local enterprises that need help to make it through coronavirus. If like-minded countries jointly prioritise this approach, development financing would generate more desperately needed domestic resources too, and offer an alternative development model to compete with China's.

Even before the pandemic, many UK Conservatives opposed the 0.7 per cent target for official development assistance. Now they have seized the moment to promise abolition of the Department for International Development (DfID), further muddying boundaries between aid and other national objectives and paving the way for them to emulate Trump and attack the aid budget. Subsuming aid within national security and foreign policy objectives will undermine the UK's global reputation for trustworthy international development. A hard Brexit and a steep bill for our own coronavirus response will exacerbate these pressures.

In response, we must defend both DfID and the 0.7 per cent policy in law. Post-coronavirus we should argue for even greater emphasis on tackling inequality and insist on clear boundaries between development and security and economic priorities.

We must defend both DfID and the 0.7 per cent policy in law. We should argue for even greater emphasis on tackling inequality and insist on clear boundaries between development and security and economic priorities.

We should go further by pushing for even more effective aid delivery by questioning the growing role of consultancies as intermediaries, prioritising community-based and informal strategies, and giving preference to international NGOs with proven records on grassroots change which have themselves been hit by the pandemic.

We should break down artificial barriers between 'humanitarian crisis' responses and long-term development aid, at home and in global institutions like the UN. The coronavirus has demonstrated the futility of short-term responses without long-term development thinking in areas like education, public health and primary care.

But this is about more than aid. The standard World Bank Group/ IMF recipe for struggling economies – take a loan but open up your economy, remove subsidies and tighten your belt – already had its critics but is appallingly inappropriate now. Reckless spending isn't the problem; economic and political stability is. For a country like Sudan, emerging from decades of dictatorship and isolation, what is needed is a breathing space to protect livelihoods.

But the IMF's short-term advice is double-edged: 'do whatever it takes but keep the receipts'. The reckoning will come. Debt is back. Even in 2019, 64 countries, many in sub-Saharan Africa, spent more money servicing external debt than they did on health. The pandemic will hit earnings, remittances and domestic resources just as public spending pushes upwards. The IMF now believes that 40 per cent of low-income countries are in 'debt distress'. Defaults are likely.

If poverty is not to kill more poor people than the virus, Britain must push the G20 to lead a coordinated long-term global response to the debt crisis. And here is an opportunity to engage China, the developing world's largest creditor, and encourage it to abandon its fair share of doomed debts – a process it has already begun.

There are shafts of light in the general gloom. The mutual value of investing in other countries' health infrastructure is proven now. Indeed, the rapid response of some African countries with established community health networks and public health messages previously deployed against Ebola or HIV/ AIDS has put the UK's dozy domestic response to shame. Faizel Ismail of Cape Town University has called for the African Union to take advantage of disrupted European and Chinese supply chains by accelerating intra-African free trade, starting with medical products and backed by high governance and transparency standards. Back in Europe, a joint Gates Foundation/WHO/EU initiative should mean that when effective coronavirus tests, treatments and vaccines arrive they get to those who need them most. Brexit Britain wasn't at the table.

We should re-commit to the shared Sustainable Development Goals but also champion agile partnerships like the new coronavirus initiative, GAVI, The Vaccine Alliance or the Global Fund (against AIDS, TB and malaria) while keeping the UN properly funded and involved as the only forum in which every nation has a voice and truly global strategies can be adopted.

In a global pandemic, 'boosterish' nationalism doesn't cut it. Openness and regional and international co-operation can still be the model as the world rebuilds. Just when others retreat and look inward, we must step forward and look outward. But the UK will need to work strategically with like-minded allies, including the EU, Korea, Japan, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and others to champion equality, openness and accountability, human rights, gender awareness and the natural environment.

As Mark Green, outgoing director of the US aid agency, said in his parting message to Donald Trump: 'The great lesson that we've seen from the coronavirus outbreak in some ways is strikingly similar to the lesson that we learned the hard way not so long after 9/11. We have to care about what takes place in the far reaches of the world.'

Martin Horwood

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The pandemic and human rights

Irina von Wiese

While most governments struggle to save lives, some are using the fear and confusion of the pandemic to dismantle democratic institutions and civil rights – even in the heart of Europe.

The European Union's image as a bastion of liberal democracy was already in question. In Malta, government allies were implicated in the assassination of an investigative journalist while the governments of Hungary and Poland were already accused of breaching democratic norms. Coronavirus has made matters worse. In Hungary, just days into the pandemic, Viktor Orbán used 'emergency legislation' to set aside parliament and rule by decree indefinitely – effectively abolishing democracy in Hungary. In Poland, Mateusz Marowiecki, known for his attacks on judicial independence and his denial of Polish responsibility for Nazi-era atrocities, tried to change electoral rules days before planned presidential elections, allowing only postal voting. Although the change was eventually declared unconstitutional and the elections postponed, it was a brazen attempt to use the pandemic for political gain.

The EU has the economic and political muscle to help resist a permanent encroachment on individual rights worldwide in the wake of the pandemic, but it must put its own house in order before lecturing others. The EU's pro-democratic majority has managed to rein in rogue members to a degree that no single country would have been able to. But it must redouble that effort.

If it can uphold its own high standards, Europe can still claim the moral authority to condemn human rights abuses further afield, and it has the economic power to make a real difference. The 2019 award of the annual Sakharov Prize to human rights defender Ilham Tohti focused the world's attention on the plight of one million incarcerated Uighur Muslims in China. But around the same time, and arguably with more practical effect, human rights clauses were inserted in a proposed free trade agreement with Vietnam, making it subject to freedom of trade associations and basic protections for workers.

Such practical defences of human rights will matter even more in a post-pandemic world. To control the virus, many governments are busy introducing new technologies such as geo-tagging and data mining which could also be used to stifle subversive ideas. Press freedom was already under attack in countries from NATO-ally Turkey (which imprisons more journalists than any other nation on Earth) to Bahrain to Venezuela to Ethiopia, but the epidemic has triggered further attacks on the media in all these countries.

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Will Britain be aligned with Europe in pushing back against these developments, or will Brexit Britain undermine the battle for human rights worldwide? Brexit has damaged the UK's own geopolitical role but also weakened the EU at a vital moment. Together with France and Germany, we could have strengthened the EU, counterbalancing interference from Russia and China. The latter has been driving an aggressive trade policy throughout Asia, legitimising human rights abuses along its new Silk Road, the 'Belt and Road Initiative'. The ports of Urumqi in Qingyang and Gwadar in Pakistan have been built on the broken backs of the Uighur and Baluchi peoples. In Hong Kong, the 'one country, two systems' agreement is being further eroded while the world is preoccupied and Britain, co-guarantor of Hong Kong's freedom, is vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure.

Britain has a historic responsibility in some of these regions, and refugees from them have relied on the UK to speak up for them in international forums. When we left the European Parliament, we lost one platform from which to raise human rights issues.

A new human rights partnership with the EU would go some way to offset this loss. But so far Britain has continued to spout anti-European rhetoric and seek the goodwill of Donald Trump's United States, already subject to mounting human rights criticism for its notorious southern border camps before the Black Lives Matter uprising further exposed the fragility of any American moral high ground.

Opposition MPs here barely managed to thwart Boris Johnson's attempt to make his Coronavirus Act – introducing drastic executive powers to restrict civil rights – last for two years. It is now subject to bi-annual review, and even this is a long period for 'emergency' legislation.



Liberal Democrats must stand up for human rights and civil liberties worldwide, but we cannot do this alone and Europe remains our most obvious and effective ally. In a post-coronavirus world, we need to work together to hold governments to account and uphold human rights. This demands a many-pronged approach but, like the Vietnam trade agreement, the first and most important step can be a very practical one:

- In concert with the EU, the UK can take a lead in demanding that the private sector be regulated not just to report on its supply chains but to take real responsibility for its influential role in combating child labour, modern slavery and environmental crime. Mandatory due

diligence of supply chains, a long-standing demand of many human rights organisations, would mean that British and European companies could not hide behind their overseas suppliers (see also in Chapter 5, Environment).

- In concert with the EU, the UK can take a lead in demanding that the private sector be regulated not just to report on its supply chains but to take real responsibility for its influential role in combating child labour, modern slavery and environmental crime. Mandatory due diligence of supply chains, a long-standing demand of many human rights organisations, would mean that British and European companies could not hide behind their overseas suppliers (see also in Chapter 5, Environment).
- Known perpetrators of human rights abuses with links to the UK should be subject to targeted sanctions such as visa denials and asset freezes, while victim of abuse, and human rights defenders, should be eligible for preferential access to UK visas, protection and asylum.
- At home we need to ensure that democracy continues to function. Any attempt to outmanoeuvre parliament must be stopped dead. And we should use all our remaining influence to encourage EU member states to uphold democracy too.
- In dealing with other countries, we need to follow the EU's lead and put human rights on the agenda throughout negotiations, ensuring they become an integral part of any trade agreement. None of this can succeed without the backing of international partners – liberal democracies which share our values, and multilateral organisations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In a world threatened by isolationism and division, co-operation will become more important than ever.

Irina von Wiese

Irina von Wiese was MEP for London 2019-20, during which time she was vice-chair of European Parliament's Human Rights sub-committee.

The UK needs to reimagine influence Whit Mason

It has now been nearly twenty years since Western leaders complained that we in the West were being out-communicated by terrorists hiding in caves. Why are the most liberal countries – which are also the most technologically advanced and include the powerhouses of global advertising – losing so many battles for political influence among global audiences?

Answering this question is key to defending ourselves from poverty, ignorance, and conformity. This is the essence of what it means to live in a liberal democracy. At the Lib Dems' spring conference last year, Ian Kearns said that 'Liberal democracy needs a shield.' This was the only line during that event that elicited universal applause. With illiberalism reigning in the US, Russia and China, as well as parts of Europe, liberals understand that our values need a concerted defence.

Under a liberal government, the UK could play a leading role as champion and defender of the standards of openness, civility and respect for truth on which human flourishing depends. In economic and military terms, the UK is a middle power. But the UK tops global measures of attractiveness to people around the world; we are a soft power behemoth. With the right sorts of people, suitably empowered, Britain would be able to combine its reputational advantages and cultural institutions (the BBC, British Council, Premier League, Royal Family, world-class universities, think tanks and publishers) with its highly competent diplomatic service and military to play a leading role in resisting and reversing the tide of populist authoritarianism currently menacing freedom everywhere.

In order to play this role, Britain needs officials who understand the myriad sorts of human beings whose perceptions, values and behaviour will shape the future. Currently, government employs the wrong people in the wrong ways. It underfunds the Foreign Office and is probably about to starve the military. Most of the current government officials who have been involved in international influence and strategic communications have been crippled by the complacency that comes from having succeeded in a largely stable and successful system. They have been educated, trained, assessed, and promoted in ways that

reward risk aversion. Their highest priority is to avoid a domestic scandal rather than achieve international influence.



Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo famously said that politicians campaign in poetry but govern in prose. The political elites who manage the UK's role in the world typically take British influence for granted. They treat Britain's role in the world as if we are entitled to it. The reality is that the quest for global influence is more akin to a never-ending campaign in an unceasing series of contests in which there are no safe seats. Our most effective global adversaries never forget this. And we need not only to campaign tirelessly but with an ear for the poetry of persuasion.

Despite collecting vast amounts of data on opinion and sentiment, Western governments are mostly blind as to why people abroad act as they do.

When it comes to operating in the global influence ecosystem, we are inept. Though government has created some cross-departmental units, we remain largely stove-piped, process-oriented, cripplingly risk-averse and slow to respond. We are often blind to the gulf between our rhetoric and the lived experience of those we hope to influence.

What can be done?

We need a new cadre of influence strategists. They need to have the mentality and experience that enables them to understand diverse groups of people and what moves them. We then need to educate, train, empower and reward them not to avoid blotting their copybooks but to advance the conditions of freedom that enable people in the UK and others to flourish.

Government needs to employ the most emotionally attuned people available for this new Influence Strategy Team. The defining qualities of this group would be empathic imagination, creativity, personal experience of insecurity and a determination to achieve their objectives. We need to cultivate more expertise in parts of the world most important to the UK. Influence strategists need to be selected, directed, assessed and rewarded in ways that focus on success, which necessitates taking risks, rather than on avoiding mistakes. In order to steer the UK's influence activities, this body needs to sit near the peak of the foreign policy pyramid, reporting directly to the National Security Council, with its director fully engaged. This group should include people with backgrounds in social sciences, the humanities and the school of hard knocks. They need to be familiar with social worlds other than their own.

Moreover – and this really is crucial – the influence strategists who have these qualities need to be empowered to lead influence work, with officials whose main expertise is government systems and processes supporting and subordinate to them. This is the reverse of the usual arrangement wherein generalist public servants oversee the work of experts and systematically skew their work away from stated objectives and toward avoiding risk and other internal priorities. This Influence Strategy Team also needs to have authority over people in the other departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, who will have a role in implementing campaigns. If the top team doesn't have this authority, officials meant to implement campaigns will often hinder, dilute or block them instead.

The UK has the potential to be a much more influential force for good at a moment when the partisans of human flourishing are feeling cowed by powerful authoritarian forces. To achieve this, we require a government with the vision and competence to play the UK's limited but strong hand to optimum effect.

Whit Mason

Whit Mason is CEO of Mason Change Communications (MCC), which fosters open national political orders and pluralism in pursuit of long-term stability. He began his career as a journalist. He was based in Pristina as an International Crisis Group analyst, then became communications strategist and speech writer for the UN's Kosovo mission, and with Iain King, co-authored *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*. After heading the UN's southern Afghanistan justice coordination office, he published *The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction* (Cambridge University Press). He serves on the Liberal Democrats' Britain in the World Policy Group and is a member of HMG's Civilian Deployment Group.